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Abstract
Over the years, policymakers in tourism-reliant economies have been saddled with the mandate to
not only accelerate economic growth but also increase the living standards of domestic citizens.
Tourism development has been highlighted in the extant literature as a route to attaining sus-
tainable economic growth. Past studies affirm that tourism contributes significantly to both the
wealth of nations and cultural diffusion. However, whether institutional quality moderates the
impact of tourism on economic growth has yet to be given sufficient academic attention. The study
uses data from 2002 to 2017 and the generalised method of moments methodology, while the
Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test is applied to check the robustness of results. The empirical
results show that a 1% increase in tourist arrivals or air transport led to a 0.41% and 0.17% increase
in economic growth, respectively. However, when particular governance variables are taken into
consideration, this impact is reduced to0.09% and0.02% for both tourism proxies. This implies
that the influence of governance on the tourism-led growth hypothesis through an interaction
term between institutional quality and tourist arrivals was found to reverse the impact of tourism
on growth from positive to negative in both high-earning and tourism-dependent countries. While
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infrastructure also contributes to economic growth, its impact is slightly higher in top earners than
in tourism-dependent economies. The results of the study suggest that weak institutions in both
country groups allow corrupt practices, which divert the positive impact that tourism should have
on economic growth.
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Introduction
Tourism is considered a positive sector by which to address various economic issues (unem-
ployment, poverty, foreign exchange, financial debt, infrastructural development and monetary
instabilities) that give rise to sustainable growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, globalisation and
development (Chulaphan and Barahona, 2018; Tang and Abosedra, 2014; Tugcu, 2014). More-
over, through tourism, there has been a supply of foreign exchange for financing foreign-domestic
debts, taxation, job opportunities and wealth creation. Although this has been associatively linked
with expansion in the inbound and outbound benefits of tourists alongside its economic expen-
diture contributions, it is made possible through the windows of demand and supply channels of
tourists’ involvement in the areas of employment, job creation and human capacity development
(Nassani et al., 2019; Rivera, 2017). Tourism has also helped the stimulation of foreign invest-
ments and currency exchange rate (Sokhanvar, 2019), leading to an increase in foreign exchange
earnings and adding to the real gross domestic product (GDP), among other significant impacts of
tourism on economic growth. For example, Chulaphan and Barahona (2018) opine that the influx
of tourists from South Asia and Oceania accounted for Thailand’s economic growth and devel-
opment. Furthermore, the work of Habibi et al. (2018) establishes a positive contributory impact of
tourism to Iran’s economy in spite of the country’s geopolitical status.
However, empirical studies have revealed a mixed connection between tourism development
and economic growth as an element of economic expansion regarding the increase in the standards
of living at tourism destinations through income rise and money circulations, trade openness
(TRO; import and export trade), urbanisation and industrialisation. This applies more specifically
to tourism-dependent countries, which support the hypothetical injunction of the tourism-led
economic growth hypothesis (TLGH). Thus, its premise is established on the basis that tourism
is one of the major determinants of long-term economic growth, although the substantial sig-
nificance of economic growth may vary among tourism-dependent countries such as noted in case
of other countries such as China and Germany revealing a weak nexus with economic growth
(Chen and Chiou-Wei, 2009; Shahzad et al., 2017). In recent times, tourism and the service
industry have continued to exert a significant effect on the economies of many tourist destinations,
and the impacts of institutional quality and other macroeconomic indicators on these economies all
demonstrate significant roles. Given the foregoing, it becomes imperative to shift attention to a gap
in the literature, which is the area of governance factors as a backup force, driving the pillars of
economic growth via tourism. This study addresses the issues of difference between high tourism
earners, such as Spain, Mexico, Italy, India, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Ger-
many and France, among others, and tourism-dependent economies, such as Macau (43.9%), the
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Maldives (41.5%), the British Virgin Islands (30.3%), Aruba (28.6%), the Seychelles (21.3%),
Anguilla (21%), the Bahamas (19.4%), Vanuatu (18.8%), the former Netherlands Antilles (17.0%)
and Antigua and Barbuda (15.5%) among others (www.worldatlas.com; online retrieved 2018).
However, there have been arguments perceived from the economic perspective that high earners
tend to constrain their expenditure to maximise satisfaction, which may be socially bilateral based
on public opinion. Furthermore, literature links between governance and economic growth indi-
cators may be projective on the ties of decision-making concerning policy decision points in the
areas of politics, scalability and flexibility of policies that drive a nation’s economy, resource
allocation and planning execution and implementation.
The heterogeneity in governance has also been viewed from the standpoint of structures and
processes designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law (ROL),
stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment and broad-based participation. Countries with a
more robust economy, such as Germany and China, are noted not to depend on tourism due to its
diverse means of generating revenue via industrialisation, technology, and so on. This also projects
the manner in which public affairs are managed (Shahzad et al., 2017). Based on this assertion,
Dogru and Bulut (2018) explain that tourism development and economic growth are inter-
dependent with a bidirectional causality relationship, which implies that tourism can stimulate
economic growth and development, especially in the area of governance. It is important to
establish that the aspect of governance has been indicatively implied as policy in the literature,
which is more of a passive than an active indicator. Good governance is expected to promote
economic expansion through active policy formulation and implementation in areas that pertain to
the economic welfare of a nation while limiting the forces of political instability and corruption,
which are the main factors that hamper governance. The direct or indirect impact of governance
determines the development quotient of any sector of government of a nation. For instance, issues
of geopolitical instability and corruption can limit economic growth, as witnessed in African
countries (Musavengane et al., 2020) and Southern Mediterranean countries such as Turkey
(Akadiri et al., 2019).
Furthermore, Tang (2018) posits that governance has been neglected in tourism research.
Therefore, the relevance of governance as an economic indicator is to be considered as an integral
factor in determining the cardinality of tourism and economic growth. It can also differentiate the
viability of growth among countries based on the policy being adopted or adapted to foster
development and growth. Government is the central core of governance, the binding force at the
hem of development and economic growth, either economically oriented or geopolitically inclined,
with tenacity tailed down to politics, especially in the aspects of governance indices, which span
through areas, such as law index, government effectiveness (GOV), control of corruption (COC),
regulatory quality index (RQI), voice and accountability (VOA) index, political stability (POL)
index, corruption perceptions index and political right index, among others, which define the fate
of sustainable economic development among nations (Tang, 2018). Thus, since tourism demand is
responsive to governance indices, it is vital to enhance the current literature, as this has not been
documented in previous studies.
Considering the highlighted motivations, the current study aims to investigate the role of
tourism development or the TLGH argument in the sustainable development of high-earning and
tourism-dependent economies vis-à-vis the role of the quality of institutions. Thus, mirroring this
standpoint, this study adds to the current body of knowledge in terms of the scope it considers,
which is a comparison of tourism-dependent economies on one hand and high earners on the other.
Secondly, this study adopts a dynamic generalised method of moment methodology, which is
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known to ameliorate the shortcomings of conventional panel estimation techniques. The use of this
technique helps to provide robust and reliable coefficients/estimates for policy insights in the
selected blocks of the countries investigated. The robustness of the results is confirmed by applying
a Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test. In summary, our study contributes to the TLGH while
accounting for the fact that institutional quality is already highlighted as pertinent for further policy
construction.
The following section presents a review of the existing literature with an emphasis on existing
research on the TLGH as well as the role governance plays in the growth impact of the tourism
industry. This is followed by the “Data and methodology” section. The fourth section discusses the
results and implications of the research findings, while the fifth section concludes the study with
requisite policy direction.
Literature review
The TLGH has been extensively studied in the tourism literature with several dimensions of the
hypothesis documented, such as empowerment of women (Nassani et al., 2019) and air transport
(Balsalobre-Lorente et al., 2020), among others. Etokakpan et al. (2019) did not find any sig-
nificant relationship between the TLGH and the agriculture-led growth hypothesis. Chulaphan
and Barahona (2018) support the TLGH in terms of exports and employment generation derived
through the industry due to an improvement in basic amenities and infrastructure, not excluding a
rise in attractive businesses and leisure sites, which attract tourists to visit Thailand. Moreover, if
not effectively harnessed, there is a possibility of decline in the effectiveness of this sector.
Accordingly, Habibi et al. (2018) found a positive significant relationship between tourism and
economic growth in Iran, supporting the TLGH in the country. Evidently, Fahimi et al. (2018)
affirm the TLGH, especially in microstates between the years 1995 and 2015. Significantly, the
contribution of tourism is on a decline over the years (i.e. export earnings and real gross domestic
product). This decline could be associated with the level of awareness/marketing of tourism, high
expenditure (hotels and housing, transportation and various taxes, etc.), global warming (carbon
emissions), terrorism and other governance indicators, which are not conducive for tourism.
Nassani et al. (2019) investigate the role of finance and empowerment through tourism. They
confirm the role of financial intermediaries in empowering women through tourism development,
which invariably creates economic stability. Furthermore, they support the TLGH through rec-
ommendations of tourism expansion and the promotion of rural-based tourism. Tourism has also
been attributed as a growth sector since it opens rare opportunities for economic diversification for
economic growth in the area of human capital development. Accordingly, Fahimi et al. (2018)
suggest that tourism has been a determining factor in human capital development in many nations.
Conversely, Rivera (2017) argues that expansion in tourism while synergising human capacity
development, economic growth and tourism. Interestingly, the study reveals the fact that tourism
does not cause human capacity development. Evidently, a growth in tourism as seen in developing
nations does not foster human capacity development, but such development in human capacity
could foster tourism growth.
But how do economic growth and the tourism industry correlate to governance indicators?
Governance, in line with GOV, measures the quality of public/civic service, policy formulation/
implementation and the credibility of a government’s commitment to keeping these qualities high.
However, GOV for a tourism-dependent state is very weak when compared with high-earning
countries. This implies that relatively few tourism-dependent states (Macau, the Seychelles and the
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Bahamas) are committed to a tourism-led growth economy, with a relatively significant ulterior
motive of governing stakeholders, while – on the contrary – the high earners operate a more
diversified economy with more regulated structures, showing moderate GOV in the long term.
Accordingly, Tekken and Kropp (2015) assert that bad governance is a structural problem limiting
both growth and development. Evidently, the construction of tourism mega-complexes in an area,
where the underground water quality and quantity is affected by agricultural over-exploitation,
does not take into account the potential problems that may arise due to such expansion. Such
decisions are observed in tourism-dependent states, as opposed to high-earning states.
Trust is a crucial factor in governance (van der Zee et al., 2017). According to Kaufman et al.
(2010), COC is measured according to the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gains. Corruption is a major factor limiting the effectiveness of governance in terms of economic
growth though measures have been tailored to curb its negative effects in both the short and long
term (Nunkoo, 2017; Tang, 2018). The COC for a tourism-dependent state is generally weak when
compared with high earners, which display an average strength (Germany, France, Japan, the
United States and the United Kingdom), which implies a more stable economy. However, it is
believed that higher-earning countries do not conform to the TLGH due to the vast industrial
impact and diversified economy generation as compared with their counterparts. Tang (2018)
reveals that corruption control is a crucial factor, which fosters an increase or decline in demand for
tourism, which invariably implies that countries with good corruption control will likely attract
more visitors to a destination, thereby leading to economic growth. This is applicable in high-
earning countries with a more stable corruption control index, which negates the corruption index
trend in tourism-dependent states.
Societal perception is also crucial in governance as it reveals how corruption is being perceived.
According to a 2017 report, tourism-dependent states are perceived to be more corrupt when
compared with high earners. Tang (2018), investigating corruption control in Malaysia, suggests
that international tourist arrivals in Malaysia declined by around 5.8% (approximately 1.5 million
tourists) between 2014 and 2017 when the corruption perception ranking of Malaysia dropped
from 50th to 62nd position. This implies that the perception of tourists towards corruption can instil
a negative effect on economic growth.
The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
which permit and promote economic development is as important as governance itself. As per
the regulation index, tourism-dependent states are weak in this area, while high earners are
generally strong (see Tables 1 and 2 in Online Appendix). Tang (2018) pointed out the low
(0.696) regulatory impact quality in Malaysia as against other indicators. Santos and Giraldi
(2017) note that innovative governance should unveil and encompass the different levels of
power in the form of a public–private partnership (top-down and bottom-up participation) in the
decision-making process. Such inclusion is predominant in high-earning states but relatively
weak in tourism-dependent states. Hence, there should be a sociopolitical inclusion of various
stakeholders in planning and implementing various decisions as regards economic development
(inclusive governance).
The VOA index captures the extent to which citizens can participate in selecting their gov-
ernment as well as freedom of expression, association and media. The accountability index for
tourism-dependent states is very weak, while it is strong for high earners. Tang (2018) contends
that, specifically in Malaysia, VOA does not significantly influence inbound tourism, showing
that tourists are not particularly concerned about the level of freedom at their disposal. Demir
and Gozgor (2018) found that a negative relationship exists between the freedom of the press and
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inbound tourism, explaining that there could be several aspects in which freedom of the press can
significantly affect tourism development and economic growth (i.e. institutional quality,
asymmetric information, efficiency effect, image effect, etc.). Furthermore, the freedom of the
press has a strong effect on institutional quality since it affects the ROL and the transparency of
elections; its effect is seen to shape public opinion and play an important role in the political
decision-making process. As such, it drives the feedback mechanism of rules of law and policies.
Table 1. Description of variables included in the model.
Variable Abbreviation Source
GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) RGDP WDI
Tourist arrivals TOUR WDI
Trade openness TRO WDI
Labour force LAB WDI
Gross fixed capital formation GFCF WDI
Rule of law index (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) ROL WDI
Government effectiveness index (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) GOV WDI
Control of corruption (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) COC WDI
Regulatory quality index (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) RQI WDI
Voice and accountability index (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) VOA WDI
Political stability index (2.5 weak; 2.5 strong) POL WDI
Institutional quality index IQI Author’s calculation
Infrastructure INFRA WDI
WDI: World Development Indicator.
Table 2. List of countries included in the sample.
S/N Tourism-dependent economies S/N High earners from tourism
1 Albania 1 Australia 19 The Netherlands
2 Armenia 2 Austria 20 New Zealand
3 The Bahamas 3 Belgium 21 Poland
4 Belize 4 Canada 22 Portugal
5 Cabo Verde 5 Croatia 23 Russian Federation
6 Cambodia 6 France 24 Saudi Arabia
7 Dominican Republic 7 Germany 25 Singapore
8 Gambia 8 Greece 26 Spain
9 Jamaica 9 Hong Kong SAR, China 27 Sweden
10 Jordan 10 India 28 Switzerland
11 Lebanon 11 Indonesia 29 Thailand
12 Mauritius 12 Ireland 30 Turkey
13 Montenegro 13 Italy 31 United Arab Emirates
14 Nepal 14 Japan 32 United Kingdom
15 Rwanda 15 Korea, Rep. 33 United States
16 Sri Lanka 16 Macau SAR, China
17 Tanzania 17 Malaysia
18 Vanuatu 18 Mexico
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The POL index measures the likelihood of a government being destabilised or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. The
POL of any nation determines its tenacity for economic growth. Tourism-dependent states are
relatively weak, while high earners are more politically stable. Tang (2018) notes that POL is the
second most important factor in explaining the increase in tourism demand in Malaysia. POL,
when increased by 1%, would increase the demand for tourism by approximately 1.4%. Becken
and Carmignani (2016) hypothetically assume that in Russia and Sri Lanka, if POL is main-
tained, yearly tourist arrival growth rates of 20% and 50% will be recorded. This gives credence
to the fact that high earners are politically stable and thus likely to foster a higher growth rate
than regions with political instability. Hence, Gozgor et al. (2017) note that the significant role of
the military in politics has been a more crucial issue in Turkey since almost 50% of Turkey’s
tourist inflows are from EU countries, where military intervention in politics is less of an issue.
The study concluded that there should be a reduction of military intervention in politics and this




The description of the variables included in the model is provided in Table 1. Data were collected
from World Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators from the World
Bank for the period of 2002–2017. The index for institutional quality is compiled by the authors by
utilising the average of the six governance indicators provided by the World Bank.
Table 2 presents the list of countries included in the sample. This list is a combination of both
top earners from tourism and low-income tourism-dependent economies. To achieve the aim of
this study, we begin by selecting our sample size according to international tourist receipts
available in millions of USD, downloaded from the World Bank’s Development Indicator data-
base. Since it is common knowledge that tourism-dependent economies may not be the best in
governance matters as their economies are either developing or less developed, we attempt to
overcome any potential bias through our choice of a mix of both heavily dependent economies and
higher earners such as India with a range of weak governance variables, as presented in Tables 1
and 2 in Online Appendix. Additionally, the use of several indicators helps to account for varia-
tions in governance performance for both clusters of countries. Hence, with a total sample of 51
economies around the world, we split our sample into high-earning and low-earning tourist
economies by creating a dummy variable based on the mean of the available dataset. This dummy
is created using STATA 15 software to divide sample size into high-earning and low-earning
economies.
Model and methods
A dynamic panel data model is adopted to estimate the moderating effect of governance in the
TLGH for the case of tourism-dependent countries and high earners from tourism. Considering the
structure of the data, the dynamic behaviour of the economic relationship among the variables of
interest is best assessed using a dynamic panel estimation model and technique. Dynamic panel
data models can closely capture reality better than any other estimation technique using panel data
(Seetaram, 2012). The dynamic panel model is specified as follows
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yit ¼ dyi;t1 þ X
0
itb þ ui þ hit ð1Þ
RGDPC ¼ f ðTOURISM ; INFRA; TRADE OPENNESS ; LAB;GFCF ; INSTITUTIONÞ ð2Þ
RGDPCit ¼ a0 þ b1TOURit þ b2INFRAit þ b3TROit þ b4LABit þ b5GFCFit þ
b6ROLit þ b7GOV it þ b8COCit þ b9RQIit þ b10VOAit þ b11POLit þ eit
ð3Þ
where yit is the dependent variable for each country i over the period t, X
0
it is the matrix of
independent variables for each country over the period t, ui is used to denote each country-specific
effect and hit is the remainder disturbance term. In equation (3), RGDPC is the real gross domestic
product per capita (constant 2010 USD); the tourist arrivals are represented by TOUR; trade
openness is represented by TRO; LAB represents labour force; GFCF represents gross fixed capita
formation; rule of law index is represented by ROL; government effectiveness index is given by
GOV; control of corruption is given by COC; regulatory quality index is represented by RQI; VOA
represents voice and accountability index; political stability index is given by POL and institu-
tional quality index is given by IQI, which is the average of all institution variables. Infrastructure
variable (INFRA) is generated using the following variables: access to electricity (percentage of
population), air transport (passengers carried), individuals using the Internet (percentage of pop-
ulation), fixed telephone subscription (per 100 people) and fixed broadband subscription (per 100
people). Data for the infrastructure variable are collected from WDI. The index has generated using
principal component analysis (PCA) after fullfilling the basic requirements of generating PCA, that
is, taking the average and standard deviation of given variables, and then, based on these two
standardised variables, checking correlation and eigenvalues of the given variables. If the eigen-
values are greater than 2 and there exists a strong correlation among variables, PCA can be
generated.
As indicated by Baltagi (2005), a dynamic model is portrayed by two wellsprings of persistence
over a period. To start with, autocorrelation coming about because of the incorporation of the
lagged y variable as an additional independent variable. That is, dyi;t1 is associated with the error
term hitðEðdyi;t1; hi;tÞ 6¼ 0Þ. The second source of persistence is the unobserved main impacts and
interaction impact, which portray the heterogeneity among units. One of the significant strategies
for evaluating dynamic panel data models particularly when managing numerous nations (N) and
in a brief timeframe (T) is the Arellano and Bond generalised method of moment (GMM), which is
used in the fourth section to estimate equations (2) and (3). Furthermore, the combination of time
series and cross-sectional dimensions is plagued with issues of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity
in econometric modelling. To ameliorate for the combined dimension issues, the system GMM
presents a reliable coefficient and estimates, especially in scenarios, where the cross-sectional
dimension is greater than the time dimension. The GMM method also accommodates for the
lagged endogenous variable to circumvent endogeneity issues (Usman and Yakubu, 2019).
Diagnostic tests
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose two tests to approve the estimation. First is that there is no
second-order serial relationship for the rest of the unsettling influences of the differenced equation.
This is a basic condition, as the consistency of the GMM estimator lays on the supposition that
E ðDhit  Dhi;t2Þ ¼ 0. It should be noted that the first order is normal in the first differenced
dynamic panel data models. Accordingly, we dismiss the invalid speculation of no autocorrelation
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(AR) for AR (1) and acknowledge the null hypothesis for AR (2). The second is the instrument
validity test. This becomes essential on account of the potential relationship between the lagged
explained variable and the rest of the disturbance term. To decide instrument validity, the Sargan–
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is utilised. For these two tests, we should acknowledge
the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test
A Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test (2012) is applied to examine the unidirectional and
bidirectional causality among variables selected in the model, in which the GMM test fails to
provide. Public policymakers necessitate the existing causal relationship among variables to
develop suitable policies. Therefore, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) developed a Granger causality
test, which is useful for both unbalanced and heterogeneous panels as well as for panels, where T >
N or T < N. This test can resolve the problems aroused by the homogeneity assumption of a
standard Granger causality test and can tackle the problem of cross-sectional dependence in panel
data. Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) used Monte-Carlo simulations to prove that calculated test
statistics are robust for a small data set, and this resolves the issue of cross-sectional dependence.
The econometric form of this linear heterogeneous model is as follows








i X i;tk þ ei;t ð4Þ
where J E Nþ and J E N* and gi ¼ ðg1i ; . . . ; gki Þ; di; ’ki and gki show constant term, the parameter of
lag and slope of coefficient, respectively. This test assumes the null hypothesis, as there exists no
homogenous granger causality across cross-sectional units, while the alternate hypothesis assumes
the existence of at least one granger causality across cross-sectional units. The functional form of
the null and alternate hypothesis is as follows
H0 ¼ bi ¼ 0
H 1 ¼
bi ¼ 0 8i ¼ 1; 2; . . . . . . N




Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the study. The mean RGDPC (in) is
22775.43, while the minimum is 382.521 and the maximum is 77684. The mean tourist arrivals in
the 51 countries are 13,400,000, while the maximum tourist arrival was 86,900,000 and a minimum
of 49,000 tourists. INFRA has a mean of 9.19 with 1.75 standard deviations. LAB has a mean
figure of 266,00,000, a maximum of 505,000,000 and a minimum of 80,914. The mean GFCF is
5.350 trillion, maximum at 3230 trillion and a minimum at 316,000,000. All of the governance
indicators (six) have a mean of 0.5142431. POL has the highest individual mean at 0.2484314,
while GOV is the most attained index at 2.44 and POL has the minimum score of2.15 among the
51 countries.
Results from the correlation matrix in Table 4 show that LAB and GFCF have a negative
association with the dependent variable LGDPC, which is against theoretical expectation. The rest of
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the variables (TOUR, TRO, ROL, GOV, COC, RQI, VOA, POL and INFRA) have a positive
association with the dependent variable in line with expectations. This positive connection is also
shown in Figure 1 for institutional quality. The variables with a high correlation demonstrate a high-
strength relationship with economic growth. Although few variables exhibit a high correlation with
themselves, a combined index (i.e. IQI) was generated, which was also used in the main regression
model and represents our main finding used in the interaction/moderation term (i.e. IQI*TOUR).
As given in Table 5, the Im–Pesaran–Shin, Levin–Lin–Chu and Harris–Tzavalis unit-root tests
revealed that all variables are stationary at first difference. However, in the Levin–Lin–Chu test, all
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
RGDPC 816 22775.43 20316.54 382.5216 77684.06 0.56 2.07
TOUR 816 1.34  107 1.71  107 49000 8.69  107 2.17 7.92
INFRA 816 9.19  1011 1.751017 3.776496 3.64045 0.21 2.16
TRO 816 93.97417 67.68246 20.68561 442.62 2.89 12.95
LAB 816 2.66  107 6.83  107 80914 5.05  108 5.30 33.37
GFCF 816 5.35  1013 3.12  1014 3.16e  108 3.23  1015 7.50 62.31
ROL 816 0.5709191 0.9263919 1.28 2.04 0.004 1.66
GOV 816 0.6741201 0.8872431 1.05 2.44 0.02 1.73
COC 816 0.5301471 1.047362 1.29 2.39 0.20 1.64
RQI 816 0.6761029 0.8008526 0.98 2.26 0.02 1.76
VOA 816 0.3858088 0.9005528 1.91 1.74 0.41 2.06
POL 816 0.2484314 0.8207496 2.15 1.62 0.70 2.75
IQI 816 0.5142431 0.8273019 1.031667 1.861667 0.01 1.63
Note: RGDPC: real gross domestic product per capita; TOUR: tourist arrival; INFRA: infrastructure; TRO: trade openness;
GFCF: gross fixed capita formation; ROL: rule of law; GOV: government effectiveness; COC: control of corruption; RQI:
regulatory quality; VOA: voice and accountability index; POL: political stability; IQI: institutional quality index.
Table 4. Pairwise correlation.
RGDPC TOUR INFRA TRO LAB GFCF ROL GOV COC RQI VOA POL
RGDPC 1.00
TOUR 0.48*** 1.00
INFRA 0.38*** 0.17*** 1.00
TRO 0.21*** 0.01 0.02 1.00
LAB 0.11*** 0.65*** 0.20*** 0.43*** 1.00
GFCF 0.06** 0.33*** 0.16*** 0.34*** 0.75*** 1.00
ROL 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.44*** 0.07* 0.14*** 0.14*** 1.00
GOV 0.53*** 0.22*** 0.49*** 0.15*** 0.06 0.02 0.79*** 1.00
COC 0.37*** 0.02 0.36*** 0.06 0.10** 0.06*** 0.78*** 0.71*** 1.00
RQI 0.41*** 0.27*** 0.45*** 0.06* 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.63*** 1.00
VOA 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.09** 0.17*** 0.03 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.40*** 0.53*** 1.00
POL 0.40*** 0.18*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.01 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.427*** 0.29*** 1.00
Note: RGDPC: real gross domestic product per capita; TOUR: tourist arrival; INFRA: infrastructure; TRO: trade openness;
GFCF: gross fixed capita formation; ROL: rule of law; GOV: government effectiveness; COC: control of corruption; RQI:
regulatory quality; VOA: voice and accountability index; POL: political stability; LAB: labour force.
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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variables were stationary at level, while 8 of 12 variables are stationary at the level in the Im–
Pesaran–Shin, and in the Harris–Tzavalis unit-root test, five variables are found to be stationary at
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Figure 1. (a, b) Graphical analysis (scatter plot).
Table 5. Unit root test results.
Im–Pesaran–Shin unit root test Levin–Lin–Chu unit root test Harris–Tzavalis unit-root test
Level First difference Level First difference Level First difference
RGDPC 0.74 8.29*** 5.59*** 9.95*** 3.74 17.44***
TOUR 9.44 10.83*** 3.67*** 7.78*** 4.48 29.26***
INFRA 5.65 8.38*** 4.23*** 6.00*** 0.95 0.14***
TRO 1.67** 12.27*** 6.46*** 15.06*** 2.95*** 31.60***
LAB 3.76 5.09*** 7.69*** 6.40*** 5.02 7.80***
GFCF 0.05 8.90*** 7.28*** 10.86*** 1.23 22.76***
ROL 1.51* 13.07*** 2.62*** 9.95*** 0.11 34.90***
GOV 1.68** 13.58*** 3.90*** 18.77*** 5.12*** 40.05***
COC 2.51*** 12.78*** 4.10*** 12.65*** 2.57*** 34.33***
RQI 1.52* 13.82*** 2.78*** 10.69*** 1.82** 36.80***
VOA 3.37*** 11.34*** 7.41*** 19.47*** 4.75*** 26.64***
POL 4.43*** 13.35*** 5.64*** 13.15*** 4.49*** 33.22***
IQI 2.48*** 13.05*** 3.91*** 12.30*** 0.93 33.70***
Note: RGDPC: real gross domestic product per capita; TOUR: tourist arrival; INFRA: infrastructure; TRO: trade openness;
GFCF: gross fixed capita formation; ROL: rule of law; GOV: government effectiveness; COC: control of corruption; RQI:
regulatory quality; VOA: voice and accountability index; POL: political stability; IQI: institutional quality index.
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Dynamic panel-data estimation, difference in GMM
The main results for this study involve two models: a baseline model and a secondary model, each
estimated by the dynamic ordinary least square (OLS) and GMM estimators. Table 6 contains the
results for the baseline and secondary models estimated by pooled OLS, fixed effects, random
effects (REs) and dynamic GMM (D-GMM) estimators. For the GMM instrument, one lag was
used. The specification test results of the AR (2) reveal that the GMM estimates do not suffer from
second-order serial correlation, and the Hansen test results show that the instruments used are not
over-identified.
Overall, the results confirm the TLGH in the 51 countries and that tourism has the highest
impact on economic growth in these countries. The positive coefficient of TOUR induces that a 1%
increase in tourism will lead to a rise in economic growth of 0.41%, 0.17%, 0.20% and 0.06% in the
countries of focus according to the pooled OLS, fixed effects, REs and GMM estimators,
respectively. This finding supports that of previous studies, such as Sokhanvar (2019) for Spain
and Bulgaria, and Chen and Chiou-Wei (2009) for Taiwan.
Table 6. Pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects, and the GMM results.
Variables OLS Fixed effect Random effects D-GMM
– – – – 0.560* (0.0453)
– 0.411* (0.0211) 0.172* (0.0120) 0.202* (0.0144) 0.0681* (0.00848)
– 0.312* (0.0189) 0.0715* (0.00777) 0.0849* (0.00879) 0.118* (0.0164)
– 0.145* (0.0538) 0.0955* (0.0154) 0.0610** (0.0307) 0.0577** (0.0251)
– 0.305* (0.0219) 0.284* (0.0155) 0.350* (0.0331) 0.0163* (0.00528)
– 0.0429* (0.00898) 0.291* (0.0148) 0.178* (0.0157) 0.0402* (0.00618)
– 0.244* (0.0634) 0.0509** (0.0213) 0.0851* (0.0260) 0.0159* (0.00586)
– 0.143*** (0.0810) 0.0462** (0.0226) 0.0674* (0.0154) 0.0216 (0.0144)
– 0.255* (0.0363) 0.172* (0.0226) 0.173* (0.0273) 0.0901* (0.0233)
– 0.0391 (0.0752) 0.0171 (0.0264) 0.0166 (0.0295) 0.0130 (0.00819)
– 0.107** (0.0506) 0.0311 (0.0208) 0.0853* (0.0248) 0.0455*** (0.0242)
– 0.0652*** (0.0355) 0.0256** (0.0115) 0.0285** (0.0141) 0.0498** (0.0220)
Constant 7.352* (0.316) 7.330* (0.498) 7.597* (0.459) 3.655* (0.787)
Observations 816 816 816 714
R2 0.915 0.738 0.607 0.686
Hausman test – 284* – –
F-statistics 488.623* 192.60* – 60.34*
AR (1) test p value – – – 0.255
AR (2) test p value – – – 0.587
Hansen test – – – 1.14
Number of instruments – – – 24
GMM instrument lag – – – 1
Cross-sections 51 51 51 51
Note: OLS: ordinary least square; GMM: generalised method of moment; D-GMM: dynamic generalised method of moment.




12 Tourism Economics XX(X)
Overall, the economic indicators suggest a positive impact on economic growth at a 5% level of
significance. TRO has a positive and significant coefficient according to the REs and D-GMM
estimators, meaning that TRO induces economic growth among the countries of focus. This further
reveals that as countries increase their level of openness to the global economy, they experience
expansion in productive activities in a bid to meet other countries’ demand for goods and services.
Similarly, local companies acquire more productive technologies in the process, which further
grows the economy.
Interestingly, the LAB has both a negative and positive coefficient, implying a negative and
positive effect on RGDPC in the various countries investigated. While it appears to have a negative
coefficient on the OLS estimator, it has a positive and significant coefficient on the fixed effect
estimator. A negative coefficient of the LAB which is against a priori expectation means that an
increase in the LAB will bring about a contraction in growth. On the other hand, a positive
relationship between the LAB and growth as shown by the FE means that an increase in the
working population induces economic growth in these countries by ensuring a steady and sufficient
supply of manpower to maintain pace with increased production. Consequently, skilled labour
enhances economic productivity, leading to an increase in economic output.
Another economic indicator, GFCF, turns out to have a positive impact on growth. As expected,
the continuous accumulation of fixed assets increases the production capacity of an economy,
leading to a rise in economic growth. As per the results displayed in Table 6, a 1% increase in the
stock of capital will bring about 0.04%, 0.29%, 0.17% and 0.04% rise in GDP per capita,
depending on the respective estimators.
The governance indicators are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of sig-
nificance. For instance, we find that ROL has a positive effect on growth implying that the ability
of the authorities to implement social and economic laws without favouritism to individuals or
groups will bring about a favourable atmosphere for the growth of economic activities in the
countries studied. Particularly, a 1% rise in the ROL index will induce a 0.24%, 0.04%, 0.08% and
0.02% increase in economic growth, as shown by the respective estimators.
GOV also has a positive relation to economic growth, which shows that the ability of a government
to maintain a high standard of public services can go a long way towards fostering growth in economic
activities in the 51 countries. Consequently, COC has a negative impact on per capita income (GDPC)
in the studied countries. While this outcome is not as expected, it is in line with the “money efficiency
grease” hypothesis, which submits that bribery – a form of corruption – can be used to fasten regulatory
processes and correct court sentences (Bhardan, 1997; Kaufman and Wei, 2000, which may often work
for the good of firms, ensuring uninterrupted productivity. This result further suggests that the level of
corruption control in the 51 countries contributes to boosting their economic growth.
RQI has a positive but insignificant impact on economic growth. This signifies that if the gov-
ernments of the 51 countries implement laws and regulations that promote private sector activities, it
will lead to a rise in the overall economic activity in the countries, which will translate to an increase
in economic opportunities for the citizens of a country, thereby creating wealth for the society.
Similarly, VOA has a positive impact on economic growth. This entails that economic growth
thrives in a country to the extent by which public opinion and association are tolerated by the
authorities. While a high ranking in the VOA index increase the chances of sustained economic
growth in the 51 countries, a low ranking will decrease economic growth.
There is a positive and significant relationship between POL and economic growth. A possible
explanation for this result is that investors are attracted to countries with lower violence and less
frequent changes in government tenures and tend to avoid countries perceived as unstable. Similarly,
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uncertainty in the future will disrupt the accumulation of human and physical capital, which ultimately
slows down economic growth (Uddin et al., 2017). The high R2 values in Table 6 show that the var-
iation in economic growth is well explained by the economic and governance indicators in the model.
In Table 7, results from the second model, which features the interaction term between tourism
and institutional quality, are presented. As can be seen (Table 7, columns 1–4), TOUR maintains a
positive relationship with economic growth in the model, confirming the TLGH in the model
presented in Table 6. However, the introduction of the institutional quality interactive term
reverses the link between tourism and economic growth from a positive to an inverse relationship,
which suggests that a rise in tourist arrivals in the 51 countries will slow down economic growth
due to the state of institutional quality. A possible explanation to this is weak political and reg-
ulatory institutions, which allow for the practice of corruption in the tourist industry, and possible
embezzlement of tourism-generated revenue by people in leadership in these countries; the higher
the level of tourist patronage, the more tourist revenue is misappropriated, and hence not used for
developing economic infrastructure, or any other purpose capable of boosting economic growth.
As a stand-alone variable in the model, IQI has a positive effect on economic growth. It is
capable of over 0.33% (according to GMM estimates) explanation of changes in economic growth
in the panel, signifying the important roles institutions play in the economy. Furthermore, the
quality of institutions, the system of economic reward, political freedom and law and order affect
Table 7. Result of the interaction term between tourism and institutional variable.
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects D-GMM
– – – 0.843* (0.0650)
– 0.417* (0.0188) 0.173* (0.0118) 0.201* (0.0144) 0.270* (0.0117)
INFRA 0.329* (0.0187) 0.0710* (0.00762) 0.0825* (0.00883) 0.0266** (0.0149)
– 0.0783* (0.00913) 0.287* (0.0152) 0.194* (0.0160) 0.0438* (0.0136)
– 0.274* (0.0187) 0.509* (0.0356) 0.347* (0.0329) 0.118** (0.0670)
– 0.0387* (0.00809) 0.298* (0.0148) 0.175* (0.0159) 0.0624*** (0.0243)
– 0.255*** (0.106) 0.159* (0.0280) 0.106* (0.0229) 0.331* (0.0887)
– 0.0889* (0.0137) 0.0321* (0.00985) 0.0321* (0.00985) 0.0153* (0.00525)
Constant 6.701* (0.268) 7.449* (0.488) 7.592* (0.451) 0.0763 (0.131)
Observations 816 816 816 765
R2 0.884 0.735 – –
Hausman test 305.53* – –
F-statistics 1260.24* 489.90* – 73.81*
AR (1) test p value – – – 0.205
AR (2) test p value – – – 0.453
Hansen Test – – – 2.14
Number of instruments – – – 24
GMM instrument lag – – – 1
Cross-sections – 51 51 51
Note: OLS: ordinary least square; GMM: generalised method of moment; D-GMM: dynamic generalised method of moment.
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the accumulation of human and fixed capital, which directly influence economic growth (Hall and
Jones, 1999).
Similarly, the coefficient for TRO and GFCF remains positive and significant, implying that
TRO, as well as capital formation, plays important roles in determining economic growth in the 51
countries. LAB has a negative effect on growth, as reported earlier in Table 6. The high R2 values
in Table 7 show that the variation in economic growth is well explained by the economic and
governance indicators in the model. The diagnostic test of GMM estimates on AR (2) demonstrates
that there is no second-order serial correlation problem. The findings from the Hansen test also
confirm that the instruments used are not over-identified.
High earners and tourism-dependent countries
In Table 8, the panel is sub-grouped into high-earning and tourism-dependent countries to reveal
whether or not economic and governance indicators have significantly different impacts on growth
in the two groups based on an estimation of the baseline model and the secondary model. Starting
with the baseline model in Table 8, it appears that both economic and governance variables have
both similar and differing impacts on economic growth in high-earning countries and tourism-
dependent countries.
For instance, tourism has a positive effect on growth in both high-earning and tourism-
dependent countries, implying the importance of tourist patronage to the economic growth of
both country groups. This finding is in line with Perles-Ribes et al. (2017) for Spain (a high-earning
country) and Schubert (2011) for Antigua and Barbuda (a small country dependent on tourism).
Among the economic variables, TRO boosts economic growth in both high-earning and tourism-
dependent countries. This outcome also confirms that tourism and openness are strongly correlated
and that countries with a high degree of TRO also experience high tourism demand, as confirmed
by Chaisumpunsakul and Pholphirul (2017) for Thailand. LAB has a negative impact on economic
growth in both country groups, as is the case with the panel model. This outcome is contrary to
economic theory and implies that the growth in the LAB of both high-earning and tourism-
dependent countries will lead to a reduction in economic activities.
Reporting the impact of governance indices on growth in the 51 countries, it is seen that ROL
has different impacts across the two group of countries, while an increase in ROL appears to shrink
growth in tourism-dependent countries, it leads to an increase in growth in high-earning countries.
The inverse relationship between ROL and growth in tourism-dependent countries suggests that
overall economic activities thrive when social and economic rules – including contract enforce-
ments – are relaxed and that the presence of poor law enforcement systems paves the way for
economic productivity. On the other hand, the positive link between law enforcement and growth
could be explained by the knowledge that developed and/or high-earning countries have a strong
reward system for law and order, and low tolerance for breaches of the law.
On the other hand, the COC index is inversely related to economic growth in both high-earning
and tourism-dependent countries, which signifies that a higher COC index showing high levels of
corruption control leads to a contraction in economic growth, while a lower control over corruption
encourages a rise in economic growth. This points again to the claim that corruption could
encourage growth in economic activity in many ways, such as allowing efficient firms to scale
through bureaucratic hurdles, thereby enhancing economic productivity (Lui, 1985). Conse-
quently, empirical evidence by Rock and Bonnet (2004) finds that corruption boosts economic
growth in South-East Asian countries.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Furthermore, GOV matters to economic growth in high-earning counties only, as it has a sta-
tistically non-significant coefficient in tourism-dependent countries. This outcome signifies that
GOV in ensuring the efficiency of public services is taken into consideration for growth in high-
earning countries. Consequently, in column 7 of Table 8, the importance of GOV to growth is
shown by its ability to explain a 0.15% change in per capita income (according to the pooled OLS
estimator). However, this is not obtainable in tourism-dependent countries and suggests that the
authorities in these countries do not pay significant attention to ensuring that efficient services are
available to the public in a way that will influence economic activities.
Other governance variables such as RQI, VOA and POL have a positive effect on growth in both
high-earning and tourism-dependent countries, which highlight their importance in ensuring a
thriving economy.
Results from the second model (Table 8, columns 6 and 11) show the influence of institutional
quality on tourism in high-earning and tourism-dependent countries. The findings confirm that the
TLGH holds in the two country groups, indicating the important contribution of the tourism
industry to economic growth in both high-earning and tourism-dependent countries. This is in
alignment with the findings of previous studies (Dritsakis, 2012; Proença and Soukiazis, 2008).
The introduction of the institutional quality interactive term changes the direction of the impact of
tourism on economic growth from positive to negative in both country groups. As reported earlier,
this outcome points to weak institutions that may allow for the embezzlement or poor use of
tourism revenue, which ultimately affects economic growth. However, tourism-dependent coun-
tries suffer more from the influence of poor governance on tourism. For instance, a 1% rise in
tourist arrivals will bring about a 0.09% contraction in growth in tourism-dependent countries, yet
only a 0.02% contraction in growth in high-earning countries. This varying impact infers that the
governance system in tourism-dependent countries is weaker than in high-earning countries.
Consequently, IQI has a positive effect on growth among the two country groups, as is the case
in the first model (Table 8, columns 2–5), which further reiterates the importance of effective
institutions to an economy. TRO induces growth in both tourism-dependent countries and high-
earning countries. On the other hand, the impact of the LAB remains negative in both groups
of countries. The diagnostic test of GMM estimates on AR (2) demonstrates that there is no
second-order serial correlation problem in either tourism-dependent or high-earning countries.
Consequently, the findings from the Hansen test also confirm that the instruments used are not
over-identified for either group of countries.
Results of Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality tests
Dumitrescu–Hurlin (2012) developed the Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test, which is applied to
check the robustness of the earlier findings. Unbiased results can be obtained using this test in cases
of an unbalanced panel and heterogeneous data. The Dumitrescu–Hurlin causality test’s null
hypothesis states that all independent variables included in the model do not Granger-cause eco-
nomic growth. Table 9 provides the results of Dumitrescu–Hurlin causality test. The null hypothesis
is accepted for variables GOV and RQI, which indicate that both variables do not Granger-cause
economic growth. The null hypothesis is rejected, as indicated by the significant value of Z-stat and
W-stat for all other variables. Hence, accepting the alternative hypothesis which states that 10
variables (for instance, TOUR, INFRA, TRO, LAB, GFCF, ROL, GOV, COC, RQI, VOA, POL, IQI)
included in the model does Granger-cause economic growth. The causality between tourism and
economic growth has also been demonstrated in the literature (Husein and Kara, 2011; Katircioǧlu,
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2010). Thus, the results from Table 9 show that a bidirectional causality exists between TOUR,
INFRA and IQI and economic growth, while GOV and RQI show unidirectional causality. All
control variables also indicate bidirectional causality with economic growth.
Conclusion and policy implications
This study sets out to investigate the differences in the impact of tourism, economic and governance
indices on economic growth in tourism-dependent and high-earning countries. Specifically, it sought
to identify the effect of governance indices on tourism-led growth. Pooled OLS, fixed effects, REs
and system GMM estimators were used to analyse the data in the study. The robustness of the results
is confirmed by applying a Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test. The results confirm the presence
of the TLGH among the two country groups. While infrastructure also contributes to economic
growth, its impact is slightly higher in top earners than in tourism-dependent economies. Further-
more, the influence of governance on tourism through an interaction term between institutional
quality and tourist arrivals was found to reverse the impact of tourism on growth from positive to
negative in both high-earning and tourism-dependent countries. The results suggest that weak
Table 9. Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel causality test.
Hypothesis W-stat Z-stat Prob. Result Conclusion
TOUR!LRGDPC 2.7187 8.6789 0.0000 Yes TOUR causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!TOUR 2.6744 8.4555 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes TOUR
INFRA!LRGDPC 2.3559 6.8472 0.0000 Yes INFRA causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!INFRA 2.5189 7.6700 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes INFRA
TRO!LRGDPC 2.6759 8.4624 0.0000 Yes TRO causes LRGDPC
LGRDPC!TRO 2.4063 7.1015 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes TRO
LAB!LRGDPC 2.5287 7.7197 0.0000 Yes LAB causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!LAB 19.7956 13.3504 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes LAB
GFCF!LRGDPC 1.6154 3.1078 0.0019 Yes GFCF causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!GFCF 2.1541 5.8278 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes GFCF
ROL!LRGDPC 1.6576 3.3207 0.0009 Yes ROL causes LRGDPC
LGRDPC!ROL 3.3006 11.6172 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes ROL
GOV!LRGDPC 0.9657 0.1733 0.8624 No GOV causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!GOV 3.2782 11.5045 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes GOV
COC!LRGDPC 2.3999 7.0690 0.0000 Yes COC causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!COC 3.3758 11.9974 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes COC
RQI!LRGDPC 1.1666 0.8412 0.4003 No RQI causes LRGDPC
LGRDPC!RQI 3.1786 11.0013 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes RQI
VOA!LRGDPC 2.3229 6.6802 0.0000 Yes VOA causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!VOA 2.1742 5.9296 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes VOA
POL!LRGDPC 2.2752 6.4392 0.0000 Yes POL causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!POL 3.8088 14.1338 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes POL
IQI!LRGDPC 2.1776 5.9464 0.0000 Yes IQI causes LRGDPC
LRGDPC!IQI 3.0872 10.5396 0.0000 Yes LRGDPC causes IQI
Note: LRGDPC: log real gross domestic product per capita; TOUR: tourist arrival; INFRA: infrastructure; TRO: trade
openness; GFCF: gross fixed capita formation; ROL: rule of law; GOV: government effectiveness; COC: control of
corruption; RQI: regulatory quality; VOA: voice and accountability index; POL: political stability; LAB: labour force.
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institutions in both country groups allow corrupt practices, which divert the positive impact that
tourism should have on economic growth.
From a policy standpoint, it is greatly desirable that more effective measures be employed to curb
corrupt practices, especially in the tourist industry, so as to prevent the diversion of tourism revenue
for private gain. Findings show that in the absence of poor governance, tourism is a major contributor
to economic growth in both the tourism-dependent and high-earning countries. As such, strength-
ening institutions remains of great importance in the 51 countries studied. More specifically, the
takeaway from our study of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and destination marketing
organisations/agencies (DMOs) is that it can be gleaned from the empirical findings we present that
tourism-dependent economies and high earners from tourism are pertinent to sustainable economic
growth. Thus, NGOs, DMOs and other stakeholders in the tourism industry can form strategies and
provide specific promotion for certain destinations in light of institutional quality.
There is also a need to reinforce the trade-off between tourism development and environmental
quality. This is imperative, as a great deal of environmental damage arises when tourists are
allowed to explore destinations. Even if they act responsibly, some of their activities may have
environmental implications. This suggests that poor or weak institution indices (e.g. corruption,
ROL) deteriorate economic growth in the context of the TLGH, while on the other hand, good and
robust institutions and observance of the ROL will not only foster economic growth but will also
translate into several other sub-sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism/service,
among others. This position is resonated in the assertion of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and
Acemoglu (2015) that the quality of an institution is crucial to the wealth of a nation. Furthermore,
such destinations can construct good institutional indices for more utilities from tourism. The
limitation encountered in this study is data available to incorporate into the model construction,
while direction for further study by other researchers is the need to more deeply research the theme
by accounting for other macroeconomic variables such as population. The need to also investigate
asymmetry is relevant to the TLGH, given that most macroeconomic variables might have non-
linear trend characteristics. Future researchers may study the impact of the TLGH on different
sectors, for instance, the agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors.
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